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ABSTRACT 
 
Reverse Auction Bidding (RAB) is a recently developed procurement method that 
can be used by the construction industry. The technique is different from a traditional 
auction system, since RAB system uses a bidding activity method that is completed 
anonymously by prequalified bidders during a fixed auction time. The basic premise for the 
auction is that the current best auction price is available for viewing during the whole 
auction process by both bidders and owner. The apparent incentive is for noncompetitive 
bidders to lower the price. There are however controlling factor beyond the reach of owners, 
such as market demand, lending restrictions, stakeholder expectations and risk tolerance 
levels, that impact on price levels. However, owners continue to attempt to drive down 
prices using this technique.  
A study into the mechanics of RAB was launched at Texas A&M University in 2004. 
This ongoing study of RAB continues to this time with eighteen case studies. This 
nineteenth study looks at the time series bid data from some of the prior work. Nine case 
studies were selected from the previous case studies. These nine studies provided untainted 
data with 6674 RAB bid arrivals by prior investigator actions. This study concerns the 
statistical process of bid arrivals with time.  
The hypothesis to be tested is that the RAB bid arrivals timing can be modeled with 
a statistical process. The analysis reviewed the fit for several types of distribution, including 
Gaussian and Poissionian. The best fit was modeled by non-homogeneous Poisson process 
(NHPP). The first conclusion from the analysis is that RAB bid arrivals follows a Poisson 
process, termed non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP). The second conclusion is that 
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the controlling Poissionian process has a square root factor. The NHPP model for RAB 
provides a tool for future studies of RAB in real time. Future work is suggested on the inter-
time periods for the bidding. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
Definitions  
 Theses standard definitions come from prior case studies. 
 Reverse Auction Bidding: “Reverse auction bidding is a type of auction in 
which the roles of buyers and sellers are reversed. In a regular auction (also 
known as a forward auction), buyers compete to obtain a good or service, and the 
price typically increases over time. In a reverse auction, sellers compete to obtain 
business and price decrease over time” (Machado, 2009).  
 Game Theory: “A formal analysis of conflict and cooperation among intelligent 
and rational decision makers” (van Vleet, 2004) 
 Bidders Personality: “The dictionary defines personality in several ways. One 
definition emphasizes the public, social stimulus, or behavioral characteristics of 
a person that are visible to other people and make an impression on them. 
Another definition stresses a person’s private, central, inner core. Included within 
this private core are the motives, attitudes, interests, believes, fantasies, cognitive 
styles and other mental processes of an individual. Some definitions of 
personality emphasize its “person” quality, personal existence, or identity 
features. Other meanings of personality are associated with specific disciplines or 
professions” (Panchal, 2007). 
 Responsive Bidder: “A bidder whose bid satisfies all the terms and conditions 
of bidding, delivery requirements, detailed specifications is called a responsive 
bidder” (Machado, 2009). 
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 Aggressive Bidder: “Aggressive bidders are the bidders who attain highest 
overall returns in the entire bidding process” (Chouhan, 2009). 
 Average Bidder: “Average bidders are bidders who attain average distribution 
of returns in the entire bidding process” (Chouhan, 2009). 
 Poor Bidder: “Poor bidders are bidders who attain below average distribution of 
returns in the entire bidding process”. 
 Economically effective bidder- “The bidder who attains highest overall returns 
in the form of profits from the entire bidding process” (Machado, 2009). 
 Economically ineffective bidder- “The bidder who attains lowest overall returns 
in the form of profits from the entire bidding process” (Machado, 2009). 
 Economic Winner- An individual who generated the highest average returns. 
Panchal (2007) coined this term to indicate a more successful player in the game. 
An economic winner makes no direct difference to the game for the player where 
the player has an objective of minimizing the average bid for the game. The 
player sees the average price for purchases and a distribution of prices (Guhya, 
2010a). 
 Economic Loser: An individual who generated the lowest average returns. 
Panchal (2007) coined this term to indicate a less successful player in the game. 
An economic loser makes no direct difference to the game for the player where 
the player has an objective of minimizing the average bid for the game (Guhya, 
2010a). 
 Game: a series of jobs for the construction of a reinforced concrete floor slab, 
each game lasts approximately 8 to 10 weeks in game play time, with each round 
of the game modelling a week and occurring in a 20 minute period, with 15 
minutes of bid time and 5 minutes of build time (Guhya, 2010). 
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 Traditional bidding: In this type of auction all bidders simultaneously submit 
bids in such a way that no bidder knows the bid of any other participant. The 
highest/lowest bidder is assumed to be awarded at the price submitted provided 
no other contracts opened on the decision process  (Boser, 2000). 
 Bid arrival: a record when bid activity occurs and creates a bid track on 
online bidding system. This record includes bidding information like price, 
bidder information, bid time, etc., 
 A widget- a good to be purchased by the buyer. 
Game Definitions 
The following list contains terms associated with the reverse auction bidding game. 
These terms were defined by  van Vleet (2004), Chaudary (2000), Panchal (1995) and 
Guhya (2010). 
   player  This represents the bidder group, treated as a single entity 
for the purpose of game analysis. 
i  player  The i
th
 bidder in the bidding group. 
  player  This represents the purchaser. 
  game  The postulated sub-game played between bidders in 
seeking economic advantage over the remaining bidders. 
This game almost always disadvantages the   player, but 
the   player created the system and so is responsible for 
the   player’s economic losses as a result. 
  game  The postulated sub-game played within the Reverse 
Auction Bidding game between the purchaser and the 
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bidders. In terms of this analysis, it is deemed to 
effectively reduce to a two-player game, with competition 
implications for all players. The   player in reality sees 
only the average of all won bids.  
    Bid time allowed for each round of play in the game. 
   Period between bid time   that represents the work time in 
the game. 
jB    i
th
 bid 
vB    Accepted bid for each job. 
   This variable is a fixed dollar sum, representing the    
player’s base price, although in this game K is a vector of 
costs.  
  This variable is a fixed dollar sum, representing the    
player’s maximum incremental price above   
   This variable is normally defined by the set of numbers 
{ | 0 1}   , although negative values of  are permitted 
by the Reverse Auction Bidding system.   is used to 
normalize the profit data. A negative j  represents a loss 
on direct costs to the i player who makes this type of bid, 
and enough of these bids will lead to a bankrupt player. 
This type of play is discouraged as the assumption in the 
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game is steady state economic conditions in the outside 
economy. Future studies may look at a failing market, but 
that is beyond this study.  
Type   A stronger player 
Type   A weaker player 
Type   Exists and who is within the middle of the profit range 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
Background 
Reverse auction bidding (RAB) is an innovative procurement method. Its name 
indicates its distinct feature, the reversed roles of buyers and sellers. It is used in the 
procurement of materials and services of commercial goods as well as construction 
procurement. A number of private and government agencies in construction industry are 
utilizing RAB as their method of procurement. This study continues a long running 
study into the process and features of Reverse Auction Bidding at TAMU.  
Prior Reverse Auction Bidding Studies and Reverse Auction Bidding 
Eighteen studies have been completed at TAMU into the Reverse Auction 
Bidding system. These studies have firstly collected a large data source of bids on a 
single contract type, a reinforced concrete slab, and secondly provided an approach for 
research studies to look at issues of personality, bidding patterns, and bid times. A 
number of the studies do not fit the standard pattern as various elements of the RAB 
system were studied by the research group. The prior studies identified the phenomena 
that the rate of bidding increased through the 15-minute bid period, but none identified 
the process of the underlying statistics. 
Nine studies have clean data were used for this study. The prior analysis and 
researches were discarded for this work. The analysis solely relies on a fresh analysis of 
the complete raw data set for nine studies. 
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RAB is a different bidding system from the sealed hard bid, the traditional 
procurement method used in construction up until the early 1990s. In the traditional 
sealed hard bid, the lowest price is still the major criterion for awarding bid. However, 
all sellers only have a single opportunity to bid the project and all bid prices are sealed in 
the bid package prior to the opening of the tenders. The traditional sealed bid process 
creates an antagonistic framework between the seller and the buyer. The antagonism 
stems from the sellers concentration on price. Other systems have been developed to 
overcome this problem for the construction industry. 
Prior to a RAB round, all sellers should go through a prequalification selection 
stage, so that final bid selection is solely on submitted price. Only those who are 
prequalified can be involved in RAB. During the auction process, prequalified sellers 
can bid multiple times anonymously. The TAMU Web based system uses anonymous 
login names for each bidder to ensure a fair system.  
The current lowest bid, which could be seen through an online auction system 
provided by the buyer or the third party, is the foundation of their future bidding. At the 
end of Reverse Auction Bidding, the seller who provides the lowest bid typically wins 
the bid or wins the chance to step into the final negotiation. Rogers (Rogers, 
2010)provided an explanation of the game theory. This is two games, one termed to 
game between buyer     and seller     as to the price range and then among individual 
buyer      as to returns from the total price available. The two games outlined earlier, 
that if considered from the perspective of a single buyer and a small seller group, clearly 
place the seller at a disadvantage as has been shown by Guhya (2010). 
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RAB was introduced in the mid-1990s as Business-to-Business (B2B) online 
Reverse Auction Bidding (Schoenherr & Mabert, 2007). Initially used by a Fortune 100 
company and the Naval Supply Systems Command , it brought “perceived” remarkable 
saving for those companies, according to the published literature from the time. As a 
result, reverse auction then attracted attention from both academic researchers and 
industrial users. 
In terms of the feasibility of Reverse Auction Bidding, it caused fierce debate 
because of the similarity of the system to bid shopping. The debates always focused on 
following points: 
 posited savings it brought to buyers by driving down the profit margin of sellers 
 what are suitable items for this type of procurement 
 related legal issues of the procurement process and the awarded contract 
 relationship between buyers and sellers affected by RAB 
The strongest complaint of course against RAB is the emphasis on price over every 
other attribute. This is considered on ethical issue by some researchers and sellers. In the 
end, it does not engender the development of a serious partnership between the buyer 
and seller.  
The real issue is one of widgets. The bigger and more complex the widget, the 
clearer the need is for simple and direct communication between the buyers and seller. 
The RAB process has a place for a small widget, such as pencils or telegraph poles. 
However, it is problematic for larger items, where price uncertainty can provide a 
significant advantage to the canny seller and unwary buyer. 
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A study of the process of Reverse Auction Bidding occurs at TAMU. This research 
commenced with the work of van Vleet (2004). Van Vleet developed a simple web 
based system to test the performance of people in a simulated Reverse Auction Bidding 
system. The web-based system’s development, since van Vleet’s development of the 
Microsoft Access based system (Wellington, 2006), includes migration to SQL Server 
and security upgrades.  
In this RAB data study, 6432 bid data points from nine case studies, provides the 
data to complete a statistical analysis of bid arrival timing. This data is a clean data set 
that clearly follows the strict roles outlined by van Vleet (2004). 
Objective of the Study 
Eighteen case studies completed previously at TAMU and using from three to 
nine bidders provide a database of information on bidding patterns for Reverse Auction 
Bidders. Nine of these cases studies were suitable for this work; constraints on the other 
studies precluded their use in this work. This study used only the data and data set and 
did not rely on the previous analysis work. The study will review a number of statistical 
models to ensure that the model with best fit it selected.  
The quality of data available to this study is finally reaching an acceptable 
statistical data set for a statistical; analysis. This process provides a model for this RAB 
data set. 
The objectives of this study are  
 to investigate alternative statistical models that may fit this data and select 
a model; 
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 to determine the parameters for the model using a suitable goodness-of-fit 
test. 
Hypothesis 
The hypothesis is that a suitable statistical process models can be found to model 
the arrival time data for bidding from the nine TAMU. 
Significance 
Amongst all characteristics of online Reverse Auction Bidding (RAB), bid 
arrivals is a crucial one for analyzing bidding dynamics, bidders’ performance in order 
to reveal bidding strategies hiding behind those datasets. With the identified statistical 
model, some special phenomena like “early bidding” and “bid sniping” can be examined 
in future studies. 
Limitations and Delimitation 
The limitations noted in the prior case studies are: 
 The experiment of this study was restricted to construction science students 
from the Department of Construction Management at Texas A&M University 
 There was no industry professionals involved in the experiments 
 The experiment process was carried out in a controlled setting 
  The risk and variables was restricted compared to real life 
 Some bidders, but not all bidders were selected for personality type using the 
Keirsey Temperament Sorter Test 
 Errors and invalid data such as clerical and miscalculations occurring during 
the bidding game process will not be removed from final dataset 
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The delimitations are: 
 The professional procurement is not a requirement and using professionals 
from the industry is beyond the scope of this research 
  All individual participants were randomly selected with different educational, 
professional background and personal history in order to provide as equal a 
representation of various personality and behavior types as possible. This 
request limited the number of available case studies 
 All participants had no reverse auction experience before each case study 
 All participants were trained by researcher on RAB in prior to the experiment, 
which made sure that all participants were on the same level in terms of the 
knowledge on Reverse Auction Bidding system prior to the data collection 
period for each study 
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Introduction 
This literature review presents a summary of: 
 Traditional Types of Auctions 
 English Auctions 
 Dutch Auctions 
 Sealed First Price Auctions 
 Vickrey Auction 
 Other Types of Auctions 
 Reverse Auction Bidding 
 Posited Savings for RAB 
 Procured Items 
 Legal Issues 
 Buyer to Seller Relationship 
 Personality Testing 
 Personality Types and the Importance in Reverse Auction Bidding 
 A brief summary of the RAB System used for the study work 
 Poisson Process 
 Poisson Process for Online Auction Bidding 
 Bid Arrivals 
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 Summary 
Traditional Types of Auctions 
An auction is one method to procure goods and services using a simple bidding 
mechanism. Traditional auctions are based on long-standing theoretical foundations and 
tested empirical work (Parente, 2008) . There are different kinds of traditional auctions 
and Klemperer (1999) classified four main types of auctions. These four auctions are 
English auctions, Dutch auctions, sealed first price auctions and the Vickrey auctions. 
There are also other types of auctions, including the Japanese auctions, the Take-it-or-
leave-it auctions, and the Candle auctions, to list some of the variants. An auction is 
perceived as providing an economically transparent method to procure goods and 
services. 
English Auctions 
English auction, also known as forward auctions or ascending auction is the most 
commonly used form of auction. It is suitable for limited supplied goods or unique sold 
items (Wamuziri, 2009). In English auctions, the bidding process starts with the lowest 
acceptable price for seller, usually but not always the reserve price. Each bid after must 
exceed this price. As a result, seller could keep the item from selling for less than this 
reserves price, by setting it at the beginning of the auction. Bidders then begin bidding 
for the items against each other by placing higher price than the last bid. The auction 
terminates when no more bidders are willing to announce a higher price. Usually the 
auctioneer counts three to sign a clear end, again economically transparent. Moreover, 
the item sells at the highest bid. Seller will hold the items, if the final bid price does not 
 9 
 
exceed the reverse price. The notable characteristic of English auction is that each bidder 
knows the level of the current best bid during the whole auction process (McAfee & 
McMillan, 1987). This type of auction is used to sell antiques, artworks, and houses. It is 
fair and clear provided that collusion, usually illegal, does not occur. 
Dutch Auctions 
Dutch auction, also called multiple items auctions or open descending price 
auction (Krishna, 2009), is named for the Dutch tulip auctions. It is a converse type of 
auction when compared to the English auction. The seller initially calls a very high price. 
Seller will constantly lower the price through each round of bid until a bidder is finally 
willing to accept this price. The Dutch auction relates the price paid to the time of the 
auction. Namely, the longer the auction goes on, the lower the price.  
In a Dutch auction, as for all sales, rational bidders always have their own clearly 
acceptable valuation of the item for sale. The auction begins with a price, which is 
inevitably over this valuation, while the bidder keeps waiting. Once the successively 
lowered sale price comes down and reaches this amount, a buyer may accept this offer 
but obtain a zero profit. Waiting longer to bid a lower price will increase the bidder’s 
profit. However, this behavior comes with the economic risk that the bidder may end up 
losing the item to another bidder (Wamuziri, 2009). The entire process balances risk and 
return. 
So Dutch auctions force bidders to think about their own valuation of the item 
before the auction and act decisively while bidding. This type of auctions is often used 
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for perishable items (McAfee & McMillan, 1987) like flowers in the Netherland, fish in 
Israel, tobacco in Canada, and used furniture. 
Sealed First Price Auctions 
Sealed first price auction is different from English auction, all bidders most 
simultaneously submit only one bid (Krishna, 2009). Like the English auction, the item 
goes to the highest bidder. Sometimes, a seller will choose the winner randomly from 
those who name the same highest bid, if there is a tie. The fundamental rule of sealed 
first price auction is that all bidders could not know the bids information of other 
competitors before the end of the auction and also couldn’t adjust their own bids 
according to other’s bids (McAfee & McMillan, 1987).  
In sealed first price auction, the bidder gets three options. They are  
 to bid their full valuation 
 to bid a shaded value of the full valuation 
 to bid considerably under the valuation (Wamuziri, 2009).  
The third option may lead the bidder to losing the bid to their competitors, while 
the first option could gain the bidder no profit if their bid was successful. As a result, 
rational bidding strategy for sealed first price auction should be bidding with a shaded 
value of the full valuation. With this approach, the bidder could make a profit and win 
the bid at the same time. The bidder gains more profit with a higher shaded value. 
Nevertheless, as noted, too higher shaded value may increase the risk of losing the bid. 
So, this kind of auction forces bidders to guess the valuation of others’ and bid a little 
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more than this amount (Wamuziri & Abu-Shaaban, 2005). Some UK construction 
procurement uses this type of auctions. 
Vickrey Auction 
Sealed second price auction is similar to sealed first price auction, where all bid 
will be sealed and revealed at the same time. What makes them different is that the 
winner of this kind of auction only needs to pay the second highest price bid other than 
the highest one. It is also called Vickrey auction to commemorate the economist who 
first put forward that this type of action as it pushes each bidders to bid their true 
valuations (Wamuziri, 2009). Overall, the best strategy of sealed second price auction is 
to bid the true value, which is identical to English auction. However, they have different 
information transparency (Wamuziri, 2009), since sealed second price auction needs  
information transparency. In addition, each bidder is in a passive condition. As a result, 
sealed second price auction is seldom used in practice. A sealed second price auction is a 
very good tool to model bidder‘s behavior, since bidder needs to bid their true value.  
Vijay (Krishna, 2009) pointed out that sealed second price auction is in some 
ways similar to proxy bidding system, which is used by Internet auction site like eBay. 
In eBay, a bidder who bids the highest is awarded the bid by actually paying the current 
highest bid plus the current bidding increment (Krishna, 2009). 
Other Types of Auctions 
Besides those four types of auction mentioned above, there are still some other 
types, like Japanese auction, Take-it-or-leave-it auction and Candle auction. In a 
Japanese auction, the price rises up through each round of bid. Each bidder shows if they 
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are willing to stay at the current price level for each round. Once a bidder quits, the 
bidder will not reenter the auction. In Take-it-or-leave-it auction, the seller announces 
the price of each project, and bidder can choose accept (“take”), which leads the end of 
auction, or reject (“leave”) the bid, after which seller goes to the next item. The clear 
advantage of this type of auction is that protect the private valuation information 
(Wamuziri, 2009). In Candle auction, the bid is awarded to the last bid price before a 
candle burns out (Wamuziri & Abu-Shaaban, 2005). This is similar to the RAB where a 
timer runs out.  
Reverse Auction Bidding 
Reverse Auction Bidding is a relatively new type of procurement method, which 
has its bidder and seller reversed. It is an innovative type of auction that was introduced 
in the mid-1990s as Business-to-Business (B2B) online Reverse Auction (Schoenherr & 
Mabert, 2007). Its name comes from one of its remarkable characteristics, which are the 
reversed roles between bidder and seller. In addition, unlike the traditional auctions with 
paper-based submission, the auction process is usually via a web-based system. 
Reverse Auction Bidding starts with a company sending out a request for 
quotation (RFQ) with clear definition of the bid goods/services. All bidders log into the 
online system at the same time without knowing whom they are competing against, 
although an economically intelligent bidder will be aware of the main competition. They 
can adjust their bid strategy on their next bid by analyzing the relationship between the 
current best quote and their own bid. Each bidder is able to submit bid multiple times 
until the end of auction. The competition during this dynamic process is very dyadic 
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since bidders need to offer their own bid as low as possible while making sure that they 
still have some profit margin. However, this type of auction helps buyer discover the 
true market price of the goods/service and benefits buyer with the lowest price, although 
recent work suggests this is not necessarily the case (Gupta, 2010) 
Among the available published articles, articles studying RAB dynamics and 
corresponding bidders’ performance are rare, however research pertaining to eBay 
online auction shows that the non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) model fits the 
bid arrival time data for the eBay auctions (Shmueli, Russo, & Jank, 2004).  
Reverse Auction Bidding, first used in 1997 by a Fortune 100 company “Global 
Co,” for procurement with the stated goals of reducing costs, saving processing time and 
paper (Mabert & Skeels, 2002). This practice was continuously used throughout 2001.  
A few years later, in May 2000, Navy Activity, a part of the Naval Supply 
Systems Command, tried its first Reverse Auction Bidding (Mabert & Skeels, 2002). 
During almost the same time period, a number of large companies listed in Fortune 1000 
began to test this new method of procurement (Emiliani & Stec, 2001). Because of its 
perceived considerable cost and time saving, the popularity of Reverse Auction Bidding 
rose among corporations, governments and other organizations. And accordingly, some 
online systems, like FreeMarkets, eBreviate and Procuri (Mabert & Skeels, 2002), were 
established to offer Reverse Auction Bidding services as third parties. These companies 
conducted millions of auctions.  
The current debate on Reverse Auction Bidding focuses on savings, procured 
items, legal issue, and buyer-seller relationship. There are no clear answers now. 
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Posited Savings for RAB 
Proponents of RAB offer the followings comments in support of the system. 
RAB leads to some direct benefits especially in cost and time saving. The saved cost 
comes not only from the measurable direct cost saving of paper, transportation, ordering 
and other purchasing cost by using online auction system, but also from the reduced 
price offered by the bidder because of competitive auction. For example, through thirty 
Reverse Auctions, Global Co, reported over $20 million saving (near 11% in average) 
out of $207 million contracts (Mabert & Skeels, 2002). Those contracts covered 
different areas, such as transportation, steel, loose fill and bulk bags, construction 
materials and services, and control panels etc. 
Navy Activity saved 17% out of $119 million with twenty four Reverse Auctions 
(Mabert & Skeels, 2002). These two cases were not exclusive ones. With 10 to 20 
percent below historical prices, the reported saving seemed to be quite significant (Beall, 
2003). This however is a far from proven point. As Nichols (2009) observed, there is 
very limited published data on these types of auction systems. The old adage “it is to 
good to be ture” appears to be protectant relevant to this type of hyped system. Clearly, 
it is a good system for small goods with a limited price range, preference of Gaussian 
distribution at where the buyer and seller relationship is non-existent beyond a standard 
warranty. As Guhya (2010) and others show with the TAMU RAB studies, a good set of 
bidders will establish a non-Gaussian distribution and the best players, termed Type  , 
will obtain excellent returns. The basic game is flawed for uncertain pricing (Nichols, 
2009). 
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However, this major benefit raised negative comment for Reverse Auction 
Bidding. Reverse auction was blamed as “price only auction” (Schoenherr & Mabert, 
2007), because the low bid won and value added by non-price element, such as quality, 
reputation etc. seemed to be ignored.  Some researchers pointed that the saving cost 
brought by Reverse Auction Bidding came from lowering the margin of seller, (Hartley, 
Lane, & Yunsook, 2004), which actually impaired sellers’ profit. And some studies 
showed that sellers always participated in Reverse Auction Bidding due to the coercion 
from buyer (Engel & Emiliani, 2007). It also indicated that rising stock prices led by 
saving of buyers’ company was actually not as promising as it seemed to be, as for 
internal controls and the accuracy of financial reporting. Also, the length of time period 
for the savings from procurement was also questioned (Wamuziri, 2009). Researchers 
pointed out that the saving would not be conspicuous once the “real market price” was 
discovered (Mabert & Skeels, 2002). 
As a method for establishing market prices for goods, the RAB system is not that 
good, due to inherent flaws in the system’s design and in human behavior in bidding 
(Gupta, 2010; Nichols, 2009). 
Procured Items 
The discussion, which questioned the feasibility of Reverse Auction Bidding of 
all kinds of products, has never stopped. Some researchers (Mabert & Skeels, 2002) 
studied some cases and concluded that Reverse Auction Bidding could not be suitable 
for every purchasing contract. Products, like strategic items and direct inputs, are not 
that accessible to Reverse Auction Bidding due to their long-term contract requirement 
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or oligopoly among sellers, (Schoenherr & Mabert, 2007). The suitable ones included 
complex and highly-engineered items (Wagner & Schwab, 2004) or standard projects. 
Jap (2002) put forward that the only suitable products should be commoditized products.  
Schoenherr & Mabert (2007) explore this myths that Reverse Auction Bidding is 
commodities-products-only auction. They suggested having Reverse Auction Bidding 
for non-commodities products by refining the RFQ order, conducting market research 
and analysis, defining detailed and specific attributes of projects, and using specialized 
third-party consultant.  
In the end, the objective of the negotiation period is to determine a fair quantum 
for the cost and the capability of the bidder to complete the scope of work. Major buyers 
place significant emphasis on reviewing the ability of the bidder after bids are submitted. 
This offer takes the form of a graduated scale over several items. However, the task is 
simple as a question: 
 Can they do the work? 
o If yes, allow to bid. 
o If no, decline to bid. 
However, in a restricted market, the buyer wants to keep down prices and 
procure on market rates. So allowing marginal bidders into the process, who will never 
win under the “review system,” is not seen as a direct cost to the buyer.  
Of course, this is not true. A typical engineering firm can spend up to eight percent of 
costs on bid preparation.  
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Legal Issues 
As a new modern method of procurement, Reverse Auction Bidding attracts 
more and more attention from manufacturing and service sector business and 
government agencies. Its popularity also raised the concern of its legal and contractual 
issues. Research dealing with legal issue indicated that there was some unfair trade 
practice (Engel & Emiliani, 2007) during Reverse Auction Bidding. The unfairness came 
from the unequal positions of buyer and sellers. Sellers may be facing a form pf coercion 
in Reverse Auction Bidding. Horlen, Eldin, & Ajinkya (2005) analyzed the future legal 
challenges of Reverse Auction Bidding in terms of some legal grounds, like Federal 
Trade Commission, Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Robinson-Patman Act, Clayton 
Antitrust Act and Business Method Patents. 
Reverse auction was banned by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (48 CFR 
245.610 and 48 CFR 15.610), because of some flaws in legal performance (Merson, 
2000), however, the prohibition was later removed. Though legal challenges existed in 
Reverse Auction Bidding awarded contract, Reverse Auction Bidding is still appealing 
to public buyer, like large international companies and government. The state of Texas, 
Pennsylvania, Kansas, New York State, Missouri, Minnesota, and Wisconsin (Horlen et 
al., 2005) had approved the legislation to allow Reverse Auction Bidding. 
There are no real legal or economic implement to a successful RAB, except that 
the basic game is flawed, that the flaw is against the buyer is interesting but as it is self-
inflicted the sellers cannot be blamed legally or economically. Buyers will continue to 
believe they got a good deal.  
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Buyer to Seller Relationship  
Since price is the decisive element in Reverse Auction Bidding process, the 
expected side effect is the negative impact Reverse Auction Bidding might bring to the 
buyer-supplier relationship. It is possible that buyer will not care about the non-price 
elements like reputation, quality and previous partnerships. This may result in 
deterioration of previous seller-buyer partnership. People question whether Reverse 
Auction Bidding can be used in procurement, which requires long-term seller-buyer 
relationship. Reversed auction was recognized to bring new business to new sellers who 
could offer lower price, while making current seller annoyed at losing the hard-won 
long-term business (Emiliani & Stec, 2005). Due to its price oriented characteristic, 
Reverse Auction Bidding could lead to profit margin erosion (Emiliani & Stec, 2004) 
and coercion to sellers (Engel & Emiliani, 2007). In construction industry, seller-buyer 
partnership could be impaired when contractors, who won the contract with lowest price 
in Reverse Auction Bidding, would charge higher prices for change orders and extra 
work if client ordered, in order to keep their profit margin (Wamuziri, 2009). 
While some researchers tried to refute by putting forward the idea that Reverse 
Auction Bidding could potentially benefit both sellers and buyers at the same time. 
Some researchers suggested that buyers, who need collaborative and long-term 
relationship sellers, can use Reverse Auction Bidding as a process improvement tools to 
check market price instead using it as a price weapon (Smart & Harrison, 2003). Also, 
the buyer-seller relationship can be kept fair to all by prequalifying bidders with non-
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price elements, detailing RFQ, providing education, training and assistance to bidders 
during Reverse Auction Bidding process (Schoenherr & Mabert, 2007). 
An important economic observation is when all things are equal the prices should 
be the determining factor (Hartford, 2005) for projects funded by shared equity. In the 
end, the game has major flaws. The flaws will always benefit the   player at the expense 
of the   player, as the   player starts the game. This is a self-inflicted problem. The 
insensitive observation is that this is not generally visible to the   player, but is clearly 
visible to the   player. 
Personality Test 
An important observation in the TAMU case studies is the impact of personality 
on the returns to the bidders or the    player. Rogers (2010) originally suggested the use 
of the Keirsey Temperament Sorter Test to look at the difference in personality between 
a Type   and Type  types. The temperament sorter test has 71 questions, although 
issues exist with scoring methods being less than transparent in the case of ties.  
Chouhan (2009) used the Keirsey Temperament Sorter test to review personality 
types and compare performances. The Keirsey Temperament Sorter identifies 16 types 
of personalities that fit into four groups  
 SJ - The Guardians,  
 SP -The Artisans,  
 NT –The Rationals 
 NF-The Idealists. 
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Different Personality Types 
Table 1 shows the Keirsey Temperament Sorter Test Summary. 
Table 1  
Keirsey Temperaments 
 Temperament Role Role Variant 
Introspective 
(N) 
Idealist (NF) 
Diplomatic 
Mentor (NFJ) 
Developing 
Teacher (ENFJ): Educating 
Counselor (INFJ): Guiding 
Advocate (NFP) 
Mediating 
Champion (ENFP): Motivating 
Healer (INFP): Conciliating 
Rational (NT) 
Strategic 
Coordinator (NTJ) 
Arranging 
Field marshal (ENTJ): Mobilizing 
Mastermind (INTJ): Entailing 
Engineer (NTP) 
Constructing 
Inventor (ENTP): Devising 
Architect (INTP): Designing 
Observant 
(S) 
Guardian (SJ) 
Logistical 
Administrator (STJ) 
Regulating 
Supervisor (ESTJ): Enforcing 
Inspector (ISTJ): Certifying 
Conservator (SFJ) 
Supporting 
Provider (ESFJ): Supplying 
Protector (ISFJ): Securing 
Artisan (SP) 
Tactical 
Operator (STP) 
Expediting 
Promoter (ESTP): Persuading 
Crafter (ISTP): Instrumenting 
Entertainer (SFP) 
Improvising 
Performer (ESFP): Demonstrating 
Composer (ISFP): Synthesizing 
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Table 2 shows the individual components in the temperament scale. The issue is 
of course the equal scores between groups, which are assigned to one arbitrary category.  
 
Table 2  
Summary of the Individual Components of the Different Personality Types  
#  Name Meaning 
E Extraversion Feel motivated by interaction with people. Tend to enjoy a wide 
circle of acquaintances, and gain energy in social situations 
N Intuition More abstract than concrete. Focus attention on the big picture rather 
than the details, and on future possibilities rather than immediate 
realities 
F Feeling Value personal considerations above objective criteria. In making 
decisions, often give more weight to social implications than to logic 
J Judgment Plan activities and make decisions early. Derive a sense of control 
through predictability 
I Introversion Quiet and reserved. Generally prefer interacting with a few close 
friends rather than a wide circle of acquaintances, and expend energy 
in social situations 
P Perception Withhold judgment and delay important decisions, preferring to 
"keep their options open" should circumstances change 
T Thinking Value objective criteria above personal preference. When making 
decisions, generally give more weight to logic than to social 
considerations 
S Sensing More concrete than abstract. Focus attention on the details rather 
than the big picture, and on immediate realities rather than future 
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Personality Types and the Importance in Reverse Auction Bidding 
Personality does not form part of this study. A future study is recommended for 
this issue. However, the impact of personality in returns in the game study is clear 
(Gupta, 2010). 
A Brief Summary of the RAB System Used for the Case Study Work 
van Vleet Study 
A website using ASP programming was developed by van Vleet (2004) to 
simulate the online RAB game and run the bidding game process. This website now uses 
a Microsoft SQL Server and data set to collect the bid and time data. This web-based 
system allows the bidders to input their bid information, which is simultaneously stored 
in the database. 
The bidding process basis is several 15-minute bidding section, each followed by 
a five-minute break. Independent variables like rain delay, travel and delivery charges, 
and delays due to distant projects are in the study to provide a rational and realistic game 
environment. Each bidder is in the game is to generate maximum profit level. 
Specifics 
The specific features of the games are: 
 The total duration of the game will be a maximum of nine consecutive 
weeks. 
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 All bidders initially have an equal dollar amount of $40,000 available in 
their bank accounts. 
 The original cost for every job is estimated to be $10,000 excluding the 
travel costs and the delivery costs. The values of these costs are posted 
along the job site address. 
 The duration for completing each job is assumed to be five days, 
excluding the rain delay. The work week is assumed to be five days long 
i.e. from Monday to Friday. 
 Initially, every bidder will only be allowed to work on three jobs in a 
week. If a bidder decides to undertake more than three jobs in a week, 
then the bidder will have to take a loan from the bank. The additional 
charge for each loan is $500 and this will be automatically charged 
irrespective of a win or less in the bid. 
 Since the base cost for all jobs is $10,000, and the default duration is five 
days, the cost accumulated is $2000 per day for all jobs. The travel 
expenses and the delivery charges would also be summed up on a daily 
basis accordingly depending upon the location. In the game, this provides 
a check on a player being bankrupt. Only one player is the last decade 
was declared bankrupt in one game and removed. 
 The location of the owner is assumed to be located in Sugar Land, Texas 
and thus the additional expenses for travel and delivery are assumed on 
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the basis of the proximity of the job site from this place. The offices of 
the subcontractors are also assumed to be in Sugar Land, Texas. 
 The minimum acceptable return on investment derived from long term 
construction industry standards is 10%. However, this would not be tested 
during the game and the players would be cautioned of this condition. 
 Payment for work is scheduled to be delivered at the completion of 5th 
construction day. 
 The primary objective of all the bidders is to maximize their profits while 
maintaining bank assurance and satisfactory liquidity. 
Rain Delay 
Houston has relatively high rainfall from May to July every year. The game was 
assumed to be played during this period. Delay caused by rainfall was taken into 
accounted in this game. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 
2010) provides the data on the statistical information for the probability of rain in 
Houston for the months of May, June and July. Figure 1 depicts the rain distribution for 
this area. 
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Figure 1 Rain Probability in USA (after NOAA, 2010) 
The aspect of rain delay would affect the bidding process, escalating the costs due 
to travel and delivery charges and the overall cost of construction. Since all the jobs are 
expected to finish in five days, any job experiencing a rain delay is termed as an 
incomplete job. 
 Table 3 represents the form of the rain delay matrix on each of the site location 
used in the case studies. “1” denotes enough rainfall to cause a delay in construction, 
whereas “0” denotes no rainfall. Currently there is no correlation between the site 
locations and the amount of rainfall in that vicinity. 
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Table 3  
Rain Delays for Week One 
Day 
Site 
One Two Three Four Five Six 
Monday 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Tuesday 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Wednesday 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Thursday 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Friday 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Saturday 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Site Locations 
All the locations in the RAB are located around Sugarland, Texas as intended by 
the developer of the RAB game, van Vleet (2004). The locations can be seen on the map 
in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Construction Site Locations in Houston (Google Maps, 2010) 
Brookside Village, Piney Point Village, Highlands, Jersey Village, Bunker Hill 
Village and Richmond were the six construction sites selected by van Vleet (2004). The 
overhead expenses of travel and delivery to these sites are directly proportional to the 
distance of these site locations from Sugar Land, Texas where the owner’s office is 
situated. The intent is to introduce variable costs into the game to provide realism. 
Table 4 indicated the locations of the sites, their distance from the owner’s office in 
Sugar Land, Texas and the travel and delivery costs associated with each location. 
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Table 4  
Location of the Construction Sites in Houston 
Site # 
Location of 
Development 
Distance from 
Sugarland (Km) 
Travel Cost 
($) 
Delivery 
Cost ($) 
Total Cost 
($) 
Site 1 
Brookside 
Village 
67.6 858 624 1482 
Site 2 
Piney Point 
Village 
38.6 495 360 855 
Site 3 Highlands 112.6 1452 1056 2508 
Site 4 Jersey Village 64.37 825 600 1425 
Site 5 
Bunker Hill 
Village 
43.45 561 408 969 
Site 6 Richmond 22.53 297 216 513 
 
The number of jobs offered each week is decided by a probability of two dice rolls.  
Data Collection 
The website used for the RAB game to run simulations was developed by van 
Vleet (2004) using Microsoft Access and ASP programming (Kim, 2004; Kingsley-
Hughes, Kingsley-Hughes, & Read, 2004). Data gathered during the game is originally 
collected in a Microsoft Access database and is later used to analyze the bidding process. 
To solve the problem of multiple bidding and Access constraints on limited open list, 
Wellington (2006) changed the game to use Sequential Query Language (SQL) and a 
SQL Server database. Every participant of the RAB game was assigned a unique 
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username and password to access the site. The usernames typically assume random 
company names, such as : 
 Driver Co. 
 Pliers Co. 
All the information related to bid process such as the cost of the job, all current 
bids, and the bidder’s company name were made available to the bidders once they 
logged into the website using their unique usernames. The level of transparent 
information is high. Upon logging on to the server, the participants were directed to the 
All Current Bids screen as shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 All Current Bids Screen from RAB Web Site 
The All Current Bids screen all the information about the jobs such as the 
estimated cost, travel cost, delivery cost, approximate profit and profit percentage. It also 
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contained the “My Bids” column, within this column the bidder would insert his bid 
amount and click on submit to place that bid. This information was available to all the 
bidders. Each bidding session went on for 15 minutes and nine such bidding sessions 
took place with a five-minute break between each session. Bidders were unable to place 
bids before the commencement of the bidding and after the end of the sessions. As 
mentioned earlier, each bidder was constrained to bid on only three jobs within a given 
week. To bid on more than three jobs each participant had the option of taking a loan 
from the bank, for which a fee of $500 was deducted from the bidder’s available balance. 
Figure 4 provides the bidder the option of accepting a bank loan. 
 
Figure 4 Bank Guarantee Web Form 
Figure 5 demonstrations the upper limit rules of the reverse auction process. In 
the RAB game, the bidder is only allowed to bid lower than an already placed bid, as it 
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is a reverse auction. If the bidder places a bid that is an amount higher than the current 
bid, the following notification appears on their screen. 
 
Figure 5 Higher Than Acceptable Bid Web Statement 
After the end of each 15 minute, bidding session the jobs award to the lowest 
bidder for each job. To see information regarding, what jobs have been won by a bidder, 
the bidder can go to the “my bid info” page which provides the relevant information 
about the jobs won as seen shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 My Bid Info Web Page 
The “all completed jobs” tab as shown in Figure 7 displays information regarding 
the completed jobs. The bidder can view the status of the jobs they have won, whether 
the jobs are completed or are still running due to rain delays from this page. 
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Figure 7 All Completed Jobs Screen 
The SQL database provides data on the bids to the nearest second, as collected in 
the web-based game.  
Poisson Process 
The Poisson process is a special type of Markov process that happens in a fixed 
consecutive time period (Boxma & Yechiali).  It is named after the French 
Mathematician Siméon-Denis Poisson (Ott & Longnecker, 2010). As a continuous-time 
process, it is a mathematical model of a completely random series of events (Cox & 
Lewis, 1966). Poisson process counts the numbers of occurring events along the timeline 
and the time of the occurred events in a certain time interval. According to its 
characteristics, it is also a type of point process of the real half line.  
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There are some important probability distributions, such as Poisson distribution, 
exponential distribution, and gamma distribution developed based on the Poisson 
process. There are five major properties of the Poisson process(Cox & Lewis, 1966). as 
research applications:  
 distribution of number of events 
 distribution of duration between events 
 order statistics for the exponential distribution 
 conditional property of the Poisson process 
 time-dependent Poisson process  
The first two properties mentioned above can be used to model RAB bidding 
process and study bidding strategies behind RAB. As one of the most important 
stochastic processes in probability theory, it is used to model random events in time and 
space (Kingman, 1993), such as the times of radioactive emissions, the calling times 
from customers at a service center, and the positions of flaws in a piece of material. 
Poisson process is very common in our life.  
The property of distribution of number of events is used to test if the number of 
occurred events over a certain time period follows a Poisson distribution (Kingman, 
1993; National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.), 2003). Another critical 
property of the Poisson process focuses on the duration between events. Through 
empirical data, it has been shown that the time duration between events follows 
exponential distribution of a specific parameter λ for some processes. To be specific, the 
durations between events are independent and exponentially distributed with random 
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variables with mean 1/ λ (Boxma & Yechiali). In different conditions, the time duration 
can be defined in different way. And its distribution won’t be affected, because any 
occurred event in any section of a Poisson process is independent in  the preceding 
sections of process (Cox & Lewis, 1966).  
Poisson Process for Online Auction Bidding 
Since RAB is still a relatively new type of auctions, most of studies that 
pertained it focus on the advantages and disadvantages of its feasibility for application, 
like savings, item & services procured buyer-seller relationship, and its application in 
specific industries. In addition, there is just few published article discussing the model of 
bidding dynamics and strategies, such as bid arrivals model and bids duration model for 
RAB so far. However, as a special type of online auction, RAB shares some 
characteristics in bidding procedures with other online auction, such as eBay auction. 
Like other online auctions, the bidders in RAB can bid multiple times anonymously till 
the end of bidding section.  
Many researchers had been involved in the study of online auction bidding 
strategy and bidders’ performance through bid duration and bid arrival research. Among 
those researchers, Gneezy (2005) used the data from the online auction of some specific 
industries, like the interbank foreign exchange market, and other type of auction, 
including first- and second-price common-value sealed-bid auctions. Most of them 
(Borle, Boatwright, & Kadane, 2006; Russo, Shyamalkumar, Shmueli, & Jank, 2004; 
Shmueli et al., 2004; Shmueli, Russo, & Jank, 2007; J. Zhang & Zhang, 2011) studied 
the online auctions through real eBay auction data.  
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The online English Auction is the default and the most commonly used format 
among those several types of auction formats that eBay marketplace offers, (Hu & 
Bolivar, 2008). In the eBay auction, the bid would be awarded to the very last, also the 
highest price auction, after multiple times of bidding within fixed time period (Roth & 
Ockenfels, 2002). Whether for eBay auction or RAB, each bid will indicate a record of 
the bid time to the online auction system during the online auction process. The record is 
bid arrival, while the waiting time between bids is bid duration. The bid arrival and bid 
duration are crucial characteristics to understand the bidding dynamics and bidding 
strategies, bidding process, and outcomes of auction (Shmueli et al., 2004; J. Zhang & 
Zhang, 2011). The bid arrival here is equal to the word “event” that we mentioned in 
Poisson process, while the bid duration is equal to the word “event duration” above. 
These two topics raised increasing attention in model the dynamics and strategies behind 
the online auction. They are also the essential concerns of this research of RAB. 
Bid Arrivals 
Bid arrivals are an essential attribute of online auction bidding. This word refers 
to the bid time records returned to the online auction system. They are a very good tool 
to model bidding process in order to study bidder behavior and bidding strategies. Many 
researchers studied “early bidding,” “bid sniping” or “last minute bidding” phenomenon 
through analysis bid arrivals. Early bidding refers to the behavior of bidders who bid any 
time during the auction period (Mizuta & Steiglitz, 2000). In addition, bid sniping or last 
minute bidding refers to the bidding behavior of bidders who wait until the last few 
seconds of the auction to place their bids. 
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Many researchers tried to model the bid arrivals for online auction bidding. 
However, there has been no accurate developed model which could approximate bid 
arrivals process with all its feature included (Shmueli et al., 2007). A popular 
assumption in these literatures is that Poisson process could be an approximation. Most 
of those literatures assumed that the bid arrivals process follows Homogeneous Poisson 
Process (HPP) (Russo et al., 2004).  
Non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP), also called inhomogeneous Poisson 
process, is defined as a variation of Poisson process. Its name comes from its varied λ 
over different time periods. In NHPP, λ can be a piecewise function as equation 1. 
During time period       ], the expected times of events would be: 
           ∫        
  
  
                                                                                                     
Then, with the dependent variable r defined in equation 2 
                                                                                                                            
it has the probability formula as the listed in equations 3. 
 [(           )]  
             
  
                                                             
Mizuta & Stieglitz (2000) introduced simulations of the online second-price 
auction bidding process, with fixed and continuous bidding period. In this research, they 
modeled two types of agents for early bidders and bid snipers to study the interactions 
between the two types of bidders their bidding strategies. The results turned out to be 
that early bidders could win with lower price while the bid sniping strategy is more 
effective. In one bid sequence model and bid arrivals models research, they point out 
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that the Poisson arrival model need specific length of the time interval between bids (A. 
Zhang et al., 2002). 
Self-similar process were found by Roth and Ockenfels during the empirical 
studies of the online bidding process based on bid arrivals data during a close end 
auction (Roth & Ockenfels, 2000). They studied the second price online auction in 
consecutive periods with the Amazon and eBay data. They found that the bid sniping 
(last minute bidding) in a fixed period came at the equilibrium point in auction, which 
has private values or unknown, dependent values. The equilibrium point here is the 
moment when there is a motivation for bidders not bid too high before knowing other’s 
reaction. At this point, bidders prefer to waiting, in order to evade a bidding war 
(Ockenfels & Roth, 2006) that will raise the expected final awarded price. Then the 
advantages brought by bid snipping are shut out. Then some researcher moved their 
focus to other Poisson process to fit and simulate the bid arrivals data better. In the 
research of Vakrat and Seidmann (2000) introduced a non-stationary Poisson process of 
bidder’s arrivals. In this model, the intensity function      within auction duration t was 
defined as shown in equation 4 
          
 
 
                                                                              (4) 
   here is the measurement of web site traffic in the auction. They found out that the 
number of units being offered had a positive impact on the number of bidders. A class of 
3-stage non-homogenous Poisson processes were put forward (Shmueli et al., 2004) to 
fit, interpret and model bid arrivals from the eBay online auction data . Russo et. al., 
(2004) discussed the descriptive models based on features of real online auction bid data 
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and the model for bidder arrivals that leads to the bid arrivals process. These authors also 
presented the model for BARISTA (Bid ARrivals In STAges) process (the bid arrivals 
process).  
Most research uses Poisson distribution as the testing model to fit the data. Some 
minor work looked at non-Poisson distributions. In the research, which studied the 
distribution of waiting times between bids on the interbank foreign exchange (FX) 
market, it was assumed that the randomly and independently arrived bids follow a 
Poisson process at the very beginning (Aurell & Hemmingsson, 1997). However their 
empirical observation of bid arrivals turned out to fall in exponential distribution, which 
proved that the duration between bids in the interbank foreign exchange (FX) market 
actually follows a power-law. The results may however be skewed by the LIBOR 
scandal (Ma, MacNamara, Bouchard, & D'Arminio, 2012). 
Summary 
As a new procurement method, Reverse Auction Bidding is a fiercely debated 
topic. The published articles mainly discuss the external and observable effects of 
Reverse Auction Bidding, such as posited savings, suitable items for procurement, 
related legal issues, and effects for the relation between buyers and seller. The dynamics, 
biding strategies and bidders’ performance presents a fertile research area to understand 
the bidding process from the large amount of transparent data available from recent 
studies.  
A study of the process of Reverse Auction Bidding was launched at TAMU by 
van Vleet II (2004). An online website based on SQL Server datasets was developed to 
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simulate the bidding process and test contractors’ (bidders’) performance in Reverse 
Auction Bidding. Eighteen Reverse Auction Bidding studies completed at TAMU reveal 
the dynamics and in part explain some elements of the bidders’ performance of RAB. 
This prior research looked at areas of game theory, tacit collusion among bidders, the 
significance of personality, the RAB game for the role variants of guardians in different 
types of industrial and some specific cases studies. 
The published article studying RAB dynamics and corresponding bidders’ 
performance is rare, but such studies on eBay online auction exist. Some researchers 
modeled the eBay bid arrivals with certain type of distribution, such as the non-
homogeneous Poisson process NHPP model (Shmueli et al., 2004). This model appears 
suited to the RAB data on bid timing and sufficient data exists to provide a tolerable 
approximation to the complete data set.  
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CHAPTER III  
METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the study methodology, including a brief discussion on the 
available process models and summarizes the alternative analysis methods used for this 
study. 
Study Methodology 
The study fits a statistical model to a point-based data set as follows: 
Data Set 
 assembled of the data set; 
 reviewed the data set and removed of suspect data; 
 presented of the data in a format suitable for analysis purposes. 
Statistical Review 
 compared the data set to arrange of standard statistical distributions 
to ;detect the model that can be tested for goodness-of-fit; 
 undertook a goodness-of-fit test for each model to determine the best fit; 
 undertook a review of the residual data from the fitted model to look for 
other features that may control the data set; 
 established the key parameter for the model. 
Future Work 
 outlined the uses of the model and future research work on the RAB. 
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Poisson Process Models 
Poisson Theory 
Named after the French Mathematician Siméon-Denis Poisson (Ott & Longnecker, 
2010) Poisson process is a process that “count” events till a specific point of time. Each 
occurred event of Poisson process jumps up to a higher state. Therefore, Poisson process 
is sometimes a “jump” process. As one of the most important stochastic process in 
probability theories, it is used to model random events in time and space (Kingman, 
1993), such as the times of radioactive emissions, the calling times from customers at a 
service center, rainfall and the page view requests to a website. As a continuous-time 
process, it is a mathematical model of a completely random series of events (Cox & 
Lewis, 1966). Poisson process counts the numbers of the continuously and 
independently occurring events along the timeline and the time of the occurred events in 
a certain time interval. According to its characteristics, it is also a type of point process 
of the real half line(Last, 1991).  
Poisson process is very important and common in our life, since it generates 
some important probability distributions, such as Poisson distribution, exponential 
distribution, and gamma distributions. There are five major properties of the Poisson 
process as research application: distribution of number of events, distribution of intervals 
between events, order statistics for the exponential distribution, conditional property of 
the Poisson process, and time-dependent Poisson process (Cox & Lewis, 1966).  
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Statistical Definition of Poisson Process 
 A Poisson process          ]  is a counting process with the following 
additional properties(Cox & Lewis, 1966; Kingman, 1993). The process has 
stationary and independent increments. With dependent variable r defined in 
equation 5,  
                                                                                                                                       
the statistical definition can be shown in equation  6 and 7: 
                                                                                                                                       
      
         
  
                                                                                                     
When      is number of occurred event, the independent process,   is the intensity 
of this function, and t is the time when event occurred. 
Homogeneous Poisson Process 
There are different types of Poisson processes. Among these Poisson process, 
Homogeneous Poisson process (HPP) is the most general one. In the HPP, λ, also known 
as the intensity, is a constant with the dimensions of the reciprocal of time (Cox & Lewis, 
1966). It measures the expected times of events during the certain time period. If the 
number of events in given time interval        ] with    as a time increment, N(t) 
follows a sample Poisson process, then (            ) has a Poisson distribution of 
mean shown as equation 8: 
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With this mean value,      as a non-negative integer, and dependent variable r defined 
in equation 9 
                                                                                                                        
The probability distribution is given in equation 10: 
   ]  
             
  
                                                                               
Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process 
Non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP), also called inhomogeneous Poisson process, 
is a variation of Poisson process. It got its name, because its λ varies during different 
times. In NHPP, λ can be a piecewise function as equation 11. During time period      ], 
the expected times of events would be: 
         ∫        
  
  
                                                                                                        
Then, with dependent variable r defined in equation 12 
                                                                                                                           
it has the probability formula as the shown in equations 13. 
 [(           )]  
             
  
                                                   
In this research, the 3-step NHPP model (Shmueli et al., 2004) used another 
model fitted to the data. The original continuous intensity functions of 3-step NHPP 
model are listed below as equations 13, 14, and 15: 
      (  
  
 
)
     
(  
 
 
)
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Here, s is the order number of time interval dependent variable. T is the total 
number of time intervals.    is the point of time when the intensity   begins changing 
non-homogeneously.         are all calculable parameter. The    is expect to be close 
to 1, and            to represent the early surge in bidding. And c is the calculable 
parameter which is a constant. The random variable     , which counts the number of 
arrivals until time T follows a Poisson distribution with mean formula as equation 17, 18 
and 19: 
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In addition, the parameter K can be calculated by equations 20: 
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If we have parameter C been figured out with equation 21 and 22:  
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Then the cumulative function of this 3-step Poisson process is given by equations 23, 24 
and 25: 
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Besides Homogeneous Poisson process (HPP), Non-homogeneous Poisson 
processes (NHPP), there are some other variations, such as Spatial Poisson process, 
Space-time Poisson process, and Separable space-time Poisson process. They are not 
going to be introduced and used in this research. 
Gaussian Distribution 
 Gaussian distribution, also known as normal distribution is continuous 
distribution (Miller, Freund, & Johnson, 2000). It is one of the most important 
probability distribution in the natural and social science. Its symmetric bell-shaped 
density curves has only one single peak when the dependent variable is close to the mean 
 . The standard deviation   shows the spread of the bell curve (Miller et al., 2000). With 
different value of     , Gaussian distribution generates different shape of bell curve, 
which is controlled by the normal density. The equation of the density of Gaussian 
distribution with random variable x is shown as equation 26: 
          
 
√   
       
                                                                                        
A standard Gaussian distribution fit will be used in test the model of RAB bid 
arrival process.  
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Power-law Distribution 
 Power distribution is also a very important probability distribution in natural and 
social phenomena, such as the population of cities, the intensities of earthquakes, and the 
decay of radioactive element(Clauset, Shalizi, & Newman, 2009). It shows the 
relationship between two quantities. As a type of long tail distribution, power-law has no 
characteristic value(Ott & Longnecker, 2010). The general function of power-law 
distribution with random variable x is shown in the equation 27: 
                                                                                                                           
C here is a constant, a is the exponent which is greater than 1.   is the deviation(Clauset 
et al., 2009; Miller et al., 2000; Ott & Longnecker, 2010). In this research, a standard 
power-law distribution fit will be utilized for RAB bid arrival model regression test. 
Goodness of Fit Tests 
For the counted data with the number of occurred events in a fixed period, Chi-
Square Test is used to check if the data fits an exact probability model within accept 
limits. This test is called Chi-square goodness-of-fit test or Pearson’s Chi-square test. It 
is the Chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic that can be used to test to fit a set of data (Ott 
& Longnecker, 2010). And the Chi-square can be estimated by equation 28: 
    ∑  
       
 
  
]                                                                                                                
In this statistic, the quantity    stands for the number of bid arrivals in section  , and    is 
the expected number of bid arrivals in section   if the proposed model fits the data.  
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With              and        , where    is the probability of a bid 
arrival occurring in the  th section using the NHPP model. The degree of freedom (df) in 
this test is in equations 29: 
                                                                                                                                   
where   is the number of sections. 
In the Chi-square test of this research, the actual number of bid arrivals,  , are 
compared to the theoretically expected bid arrivals,   , to check if the data followed the 
model. A comparison between the calculated    and the critical value of Chi-square 
distribution table with the same degree of freedom provides the data for the hypothesis 
being tested that the data fit the model.  
Data Analysis Methods 
The data analysis methods were: 
 collecting all data into timed sections; 
 fitting data in the proposed methods; 
 testing data-fit-in with model regression; 
 further testing data-fit-in condition with goodness-of-fit test. 
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CHAPTER IV  
RESULTS 
Introduction 
This chapter can be summarized as: 
 data set and analysis 
 statistical review 
 summary and potential future work 
Reverse Auction Bidding has been studies by nineteen researchers at TAMU in the 
past decade. These researchers have studied a variety of issues concerning RAB. This 
study is the first major study of an aggregated data set from a selection of the nineteen 
studies.  
Data Set and Analysis 
Introduction 
All data in this research came from the previous RAB research experiments 
among Texas A&M University (TAMU) students. Van Vleet II (2004) designed the 
repeatable experiment. TAMU students involved in the experiments acted as 
construction bidders. It was assumed that all bidders taking part in these auctions had 
passed the prequalification selection of the experience and qualifications. In addition, all 
bidders were on the same educational level of RAB. Each bidding section was held in a 
15 minutes section. A summary of the nineteen studies is shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
Summary of Nineteen Case Studies 
Study 
Number 
Name Date Topic 
1 Van Vleet Jul-04 First Study to establish system, no controls on price 
2 Shankar Jul-05 Duplicated Van Vleet’s study 
3 Gregory Dec-06 Multi-game study 
4 Gujarathi Nov-07 tacit collusion game study 
5 Panchal Nov-07 Standard Study 
6 Chouhan Aug-09 Bidder’s personality impact study 
7 Chaudhari Dec-09 Owners Interference study 
8 Machado Nov-09 Bidder’s personality significance study 
9 Petersen May-10 Performance of poor economic performer  
10 Guhya May-10 Statistical Analysis of First Case Study 
11 Saigonkar May-10 Personality significance and impact on returns 
12 Billing Aug-10 Graph Theory Study 
13 Gupta Aug-10 Role Variants of Guardians in the Facilities 
Management Industry 
14 Patel Aug-10 Significance of Personality Types on the Impact of 
Returns 
15 Somani Aug-10 Role Variants of Guardians in the Construction 
Industry 
16 Plumber Aug-10 bidders' Personality Type 
17 Bedekar Dec-10 bidding strategy pattern of first time bidders 
18 Bhalerao Aug-11 Statistical Study in profit percentage 
19 Xun Aug-12 Multi Group Study, repeat study 3 
20 Shu Aug-13 Bid Arrival study 
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As for the general online RAB, each bidders could bid multiple times until the 
bidding time period ended. Bidders must bid lower than the current best bid. Thus, the 
final lowest bid would be accepted in the final negotiation process. During the bidding 
process, all bidding actions, including cost, time, contractor, bid order etc., were 
recorded by an online RAB system. The website for the online RAB system was created 
by Kim (2004), and then redeveloped with SQL Server by Wellington (2006). With this 
system, experimental data, including project, bid time, section time period, bidders 
information, were stored in the SQL dataset. Nine experiment datasets fitted the 
requirements for this research. The other data sets had been designed to test specific 
matters were considered not suitable for this research work. 
The data sets were eliminated for several reasons including: 
 a change in the bid time period, one attempt to use a ten minute bid 
period proved to be problematic as insufficient time elapsed for the 
bidding to stabilized; 
 one study included a bidder who drove the bid prices down modeling 
owner interference in the project; 
 very short games; 
Table 6 provides a sample of the bid details table from the database. 
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Table 6  
Original Access Dataset Sample 1 (Bid Table) 
bidID jobID ctrID bidAmount bidDate bidTime 
5 1 4 $12,999.00  1 7:01:02 PM 
19 1 4 $12,400.00  1 7:02:21 PM 
88 1 4 $12,150.00  1 7:11:48 PM 
105 1 7 $12,149.00  1 7:13:27 PM 
2 1 8 $13,000.00  1 7:00:22 PM 
11 1 8 $12,500.00  1 7:01:39 PM 
22 1 8 $12,200.00  1 7:02:52 PM 
1 1 9 $15,000.00  1 7:00:20 PM 
115 1 9 $12,000.00  1 7:14:16 PM 
62 2 4 $12,999.00  1 7:09:30 PM 
89 2 4 $12,450.00  1 7:11:52 PM 
95 2 4 $12,200.00  1 7:12:22 PM 
104 2 4 $12,100.00  1 7:13:20 PM 
8 2 7 $13,500.00  1 7:01:29 PM 
Table 6 shows the identified used in the database. The data shown in the table is: 
 bidID - a unique sequential number assigned to each bid 
 jobID - a unique sequential number assigned to each job 
 ctrlID - - a number cosigned to each bidder 
 bidAmount - the amount bid for this offer 
 bidDate - a day code for the game in data set (1, 2, 3, …, n day) 
 bidTime - the actual time when the bid record occurs in the system 
 
Table 7 shows a sample of the job details table from the database.  
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Table 7  
Original Access Dataset Sample 2 (Job Table) 
jobID siteID jobPrice ctrID jobBidStartTime jobBidEndTime 
1 6 12000 9 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
2 5 12100 4 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
3 5 11999 7 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
4 5 12000 9 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
5 6 11750 8 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
6 4 11999 7 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
7 3 12300 9 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
8 4 11999 4 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
9 3 12499 7 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
10 1 12300 8 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
11 1 12000 9 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
12 1 12300 8 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
13 2 10900 6 5/4/04 7:00 PM 5/4/04 7:15 PM 
14 4 12000 4 5/4/04 7:20 PM 5/4/04 7:35 PM 
15 4 12450 4 5/4/04 7:20 PM 5/4/04 7:35 PM 
 
The additional data shown in  
Table 7 is: 
 siteID –the unique integer identified each site; 
 jobPrice –the winning bid; 
 jobTimes – the start and end time for the bidding sessions. 
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Time is an interesting problem for online auction and bidding systems. One of the 
first changes made to the web system was the inclusion of a clock on the pages to allow 
bidders to keep track of the time. 
Data Transformation 
The data from the nine data sets provided the input to a single data set. The key 
characteristics of the data set are: 
 A new and unique identification numbers was given to all participants. 
 A count of the number of bidders yields 76. 
 A count of the number of experiments yields nine. 
 A count of the number of bidding weeks yields 97. 
 A count of the number of projects yields 916. 
 A count of the number of bids yields 6432 valid bids from 6647 bids. 
 The data shown in the table is: 
 Case Study ID – Assigned ID of case study follow the chronological order 
 Number of Bidder – Total number of involved bidder for the related case study 
 Number of Section – Total number of 15-minute section recorded for the related 
case study 
 Number of Project – Total number of involved project for the related case study 
 Number of Bids - Total number of bid arrival record for the related case study 
Table 8 provides a summary of the bid and record data for the nine case studies. 
The data shown in the table is: 
 Case Study ID – Assigned ID of case study follow the chronological order 
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 Number of Bidder – Total number of involved bidder for the related case study 
 Number of Section – Total number of 15-minute section recorded for the related 
case study 
 Number of Project – Total number of involved project for the related case study 
 Number of Bids - Total number of bid arrival record for the related case study 
Table 8  
Bid and Record Data Summary 
Experiment Date 
Case Study 
ID 
Number of 
Bidder 
Number of 
Section 
Number of 
Project 
Number of 
Bid 
4-May-2004 1 5 8 86 773 
29-May-2006 2 4 25 118 192 
4-Jun-2006 3 9 13 156 1077 
5-Nov-2007 4 4 5 43 346 
6-Apr-2010 5 5 8 54 804 
3-Apr-2010 6 37 10 179 776 
8-Jun-2010 7 4 10 97 865 
10-Jun-2010 8 4 9 92 759 
11-Jun-2010 9 4 9 91 1082 
Total   76 97 916 6674 
 
The typical game involved for players van. Vleet (2004) looked at the issue of collusion 
of the players. The Herfindahl Index is a potent measurement of the chance of collusion. 
A HI for 4 to 5 players provides a reasonable competitive level. As can be observed is 
the data shown in the table is: 
 Case Study ID – Assigned ID of case study follow the chronological order 
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 Number of Bidder – Total number of involved bidder for the related case study 
 Number of Section – Total number of 15-minute section recorded for the related 
case study 
 Number of Project – Total number of involved project for the related case study 
 Number of Bids - Total number of bid arrival record for the related case study 
From Table 8, it is shown that some games used more than five players to test 
while the interest competition drove down pricing. 
Table 9 shows the sample of the number of bids during each section within the 
overall data set. Table 9 only shows the critical number of bid arrivals during each of 97 
assigned 15-minute bidding sections. The data was filtered with Excel to present the 
sections having more than 100 bid arrivals to avoid some zero bid arrivals sections. Each 
data point was reviewed to prove that it met the roles of the some and game and that it 
was completed. Data that did not meet this criterion were eliminated. 
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Table 9  
Bid Arrivals during Each Section (Filtered Sample) 
Section ID Total Number of Bid Arrivals During Each Section 
1 130 
5 117 
6 109 
41 123 
42 174 
43 217 
44 149 
45 115 
48 119 
51 140 
52 155 
53 214 
54 237 
56 205 
57 147 
 
The next stage of the data transformation included: 
 calculating the relative bid arrival time based on the section start time and actual 
bid time for each bid. 
 transforming the relative bid arrival time from hour-minute-second into second 
type. 
 analyzing this second type of relative bid time is the bid arrival record that this 
research using standard statistical techniques. 
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Data Errors and Correction 
The experiment rules requires that all bidding activities should be performed with 
15 minute bidding section, which means that bid arrivals’ value in seconds should not 
exceed 900. However, there was some bid arrivals’ value exceeding 900 due to some 
unknown flaw of the TAMU RAB website or SQL Server dataset. This flaw should be 
corrected for future case studies. The bid arrivals’ times were checked and the invalid 
data were marked for deletion. The invalid data was removed from the bid arrivals’ data 
set to provide final set, which was to be used in the statistical analysis. Table 10 shows a 
summary of the valid 6432 bid arrivals used for further statistical analysis. In Table 10, 
the data were ranked by “Bid Time” column. The first five columns show the basic bid 
arrival data from prior case studies. The “relative bid time” comes from the subtraction 
“Section Start” from “Bid Time”. The hour-minute-second type of relative bid time was 
transformed to second-only type and became bid arrival, which was then used for 
statistical analysis. The last column was used to mark the invalid bid arrival data, which 
was then removed from the final data set. After validation process, there are 6432 bid 
arrival records being taken in to final data set for statistical analysis. The method used is 
to plot of bid arrival records from nine case studies. Each one shows the plot of all bid 
arrival time record from case study. Each bid arrival record point carried its value of its 
bid arrival order number (value of x axis) and the time point in second (value of y axis) 
when this bid arrival occurred. 
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Table 10  
Completed Bid Data Set Characteristics 
Bid 
ID 
Project 
ID 
Bid 
Time 
(PM) 
Section  
Start 
(PM) 
Section 
End 
(PM) 
Relative  
Bid 
Time 
Bid 
Arrivals 
Validation 
1 1 4:05:06 4:00:00 4:15:00 0:05:06 306 594 
4 1 4:05:43  4:00:00  4:15:00  0:05:43 343 557 
2 2 4:05:19  4:00:00  4:15:00  0:05:19 319 581 
13 2 4:15:10  4:00:00  4:15:00  0:15:10 910 10 
3 3 4:05:27  4:00:00  4:15:00  0:05:27 327 573 
5 4 4:06:19  4:00:00  4:15:00  0:06:19 379 521 
12 4 4:14:24  4:00:00  4:15:00  0:14:24 864 36 
10 5 4:11:14  4:00:00  4:15:00  0:11:14 674 226 
11 5 4:11:22  4:00:00  4:15:00  0:11:22 682 218 
9 6 4:10:36  4:00:00  4:15:00  0:10:36 636 264 
7 7 4:10:04  4:00:00  4:15:00  0:10:04 604 296 
8 7 4:10:27  4:00:00  4:15:00  0:10:27 627 273 
6 8 4:08:59  4:00:00  4:15:00  0:08:59 539 361 
15 9 4:21:52  4:20:00 4:35:00  0:01:52 112 788 
 
Figure 8 shows the bid arrival data for the first case study. 
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Figure 8 Bid Arrival Time Data for Case Study One 
From Figure 8, it is hard to figure out the trend that the potential statistical 
distribution for the bid arrival data. The homogeneous plotted bid arrivals records show 
that bid activities happened with no rule and all bidders in case study one bided 
randomly over 15-minute section. This situation can be explained as “early bidding” 
phenomenon. 
 Figure 9 shows the bid arrival time for the ninth case study.  
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Figure 9 Bid Arrival Time Data for Case Study Nine 
From Figure 9, it is clear to see that most of bid arrival record occurs when time 
is approaching the last 200 seconds (700-900). The bidding activity became much more 
fierce when the auctions were closed to the end. This situation is a very good sample to 
show “bid sniping” phenomenon. The last two figures are plotted at the same scale for 
comparison purposes. 
Different conclusions were derived from those two samples of case study bid 
arrival plots, so as the plots from seven other case studies. Figure 8 and Figure 9 shows 
the problem of trying to determine the statistical properties from a limited data set. The 
data shows some patterns but is too limited to show an overall statistical pattern. A 
number of the previous research studies looked at this problem but failed to reach a 
reasonable conclusion (Billing, 2010; Chaudary, 2009; Chouhan, 2009; Gregory, 2006; 
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Guhya, 2010a; Gupta, 2010; Machado, 2009; Panchal, 2007; Saigaonkar, 2010; Shankar, 
2005; van Vleet, 2004). This problem may result from limited size of data sample, which 
only focused on the data set from single case study. Therefore, the author enlarged the 
data sample size, in order to figure out the specific statistical process that RAB bid 
arrival follows. The bid arrival data is put together for analysis. 
Bid Time Analysis 
This RAB experiment was designed to be repeatable (Fisher, 1971) and each 
section with similar virtual construction projects was linearly independent. Hence, each 
bid arrival is considered to be an independent value. Hence, all bid arrivals from the nine 
experiments are collected and placed into a 15-minute summary section.  
Table 11 provides a summary of a sample of the bid data in five-second 
increments. This complete set of data in the 15-minute section was divided into 180 time 
intervals with chronological order, which covers five second each. The number of bid 
arrivals and cumulative number of bid arrivals over each time interval were counted for 
each five-second interval. 
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Table 11  
Sample of the Bid Data in Five Second Increments 
Time Interval ID Number of Bid Arrivals 
(5 Sec) 
Cumulative Number of Bid Arrivals 
(5 Sec) 
1 0 0 
2 4 4 
3 17 21 
4 20 41 
5 16 57 
6 25 78 
7 23 105 
8 24 129 
9 24 153 
10 24 177 
11 33 210 
12 14 224 
13 29 253 
14 26 279 
 
Figure 10 shows the tendency plot of RAB bid arrivals for time-continuous 15-
minute section for the complete data set for five-second intervals. The x-axis plots the 
order of time interval, and the y-axis plots the number of bid arrivals during the 
corresponding time interval.  
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Figure 10 Bid Arrivals for Complete Set 
Figure 10 shows a tolerably stable pattern. It is significantly more stable than the 
pattern observed by (Guhya, 2010) in the first cash study. Guhya postulated the third 
order polynomial provided to fit to this data. He characterized each player as “constant” 
“variable”, “low rate aggressive” and “aggressive”. This matter is a future research issue 
to determine if bidders do bid at different rates. 
The phenomena of “early bidding”, “bid sniping” or “last minute bidding” are 
obvious in this plot. During the first 600 seconds, the plot shows low density of bid 
arrivals, which indicates “early bidding”. The number of RAB bid arrivals then rockets 
significantly when the bidding time getting close to the end. The RAB bid arrivals 
typically experience a mass amount of ‘last minute bidding”. The heterogeneity in RAB 
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bidding dynamics is quite similar to the situations of eBay online auction that were 
mentioned by other researchers (Shmueli et al., 2004; Shmueli et al., 2007). 
Figure 11 shows the cumulative number of bid arrivals of 180 time intervals for 
the summary 15-minute section. 
 
Figure 11 Cumulative Bid Arrivals for Complete Set 
Figure 11 shows the tendency plot of cumulative number of RAB bid arrivals for 
continuous 15-minute section. The x-axis stands for the order of time interval, and the y-
axis stands for the cumulative number of bid arrivals during the corresponding time 
interval. The curve rises smoothly. This result is similar to the research that modeled the 
eBay online auction bid arrivals (Shmueli et al., 2004).  
Figure 12 shows the linear regression fit. Clearly the data is not linear in time. 
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Figure 12 Cumulative Bid Arrivals for Complete Set (Linear Fit) 
Figure 13 shows a polynomial fit. 
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Figure 13 Cumulative Bid Arrivals for Complete Set (Polynomial Fit) 
Figure 11, Figure 12  and Figure 13 provide a summary of the data for 
completing the statistical data fit. The first step in the process is to fit equations to the 
data with standard linear regression model available in Excel. Fitted equations are shown 
on Figure 12 for a linear regression. Figure 13 shows a polynomial fit. 
Clearly, the data is not linear or polynomial fit. The second stage is to fit and 
check the various distributions. A Gaussian distribution yields an unacceptable error in 
the fit and is not considered further. A Power-law distribution yields an unacceptable 
error in the fit and is not considered further. A Homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP) 
yields tolerable fit, but deviations at the start, middle and end of the data suggests that 
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time has an impact on the data and the inhomogeneous process it more likely to fit this 
data as for the eBay auction did. 
Model Regression 
 Human behavior can be modeled via standard statistical distributions. The Non-
homogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) model is a complex statistical model, so the 
fitting steps were: 
 determining the data for the fitting model for each time interval; 
 comparing the fitted data to the experiment data and determining  χ² estimates for 
goodness-of-fit test; 
 reviewing the  χ² estimates and the residual data using Fast Fourier transformation 
techniques (Brigham, 1988) to see if a cyclic pattern exists within the primary statistical 
model residual data 
Formulas and Definition 
The NHPP model is different from a normal Poisson process, since its intensity is 
a function of time. If bids arrive during     ] in line with a NHPP           ,  the 
intensity function is the equation 30. 
       (  
 
 
)
   
                                                                    
if   was assumed as 0.5, the intensity function could be presented as equation 31 to 
show a simple form to the  standard equation 11. 
      
 
√  
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This function shows that         when    , which means that the bid arrivals’ 
density becomes higher and higher towards the end. This characteristic simulates the 
“bid sniping” well. Human are not automatous, as happening when a Poisson 
distribution controls a machinery process. Human beings do not switch on automatically 
at the beginning of a game, do take breaks for human reasons, and have a quick, but 
limited reaction time to input data. All of these issues will act to introduce residual errors 
into the data set. As with other such as data, a Fast Fourier transform analysis of the residual 
data will provide insight with the human elements in the underlying model. 
NHPP Model Test Fit 
In the simplest form, it is possible to use the linear regression to demonstrate that 
the rate of bid arrival in the game period. A regression coefficient variance or    from 
results is a tolerable indication of this pattern. However, a better fit can be tested with χ² 
statistic. The technique used for this study is: 
 fitting the NHPP model data with α as variable; 
 determining the χ² statistic for each fitted bid arrival record in terms of α; 
 varying the period of the time steps to look at change in the χ²; 
 determining the time step of α that minimizing the χ² statistic for the data; 
 assuming fit model has the same number of bid arrivals as the experiment data. 
In order to assure the veracity, the 15-minute section was cut into wider time 
interval pieces, so that the statistical analysis results would not be affected by unknown 
singularities. Then the number of bid arrivals of 20 time intervals within the 15-minute 
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section was calculated for testing the NHPP model. Table 12 shows the RAB bid arrivals 
NHPP model testing process.  
Table 12  
NHPP Model Regression 
Time 
interval ID 
(s) 
s/T 1-s/T λ=(1-s/T)^(α-1) No. of bid 
arrivals 
(experiment) 
No. of bid 
arrivals  
(NHPP model) 
1 0.0500 0.9500 1.0260 153 149.1260 
2 0.1000 0.9000 1.0541 204 193.5314 
3 0.1500 0.8500 1.0847 197 181.6250 
4 0.2000 0.8000 1.1180 194 173.5189 
5 0.2500 0.7500 1.1547 204 176.6692 
6 0.3000 0.7000 1.1952 189 158.1287 
7 0.3500 0.6500 1.2403 179 144.3144 
8 0.4000 0.6000 1.2910 173 134.0052 
9 0.4500 0.5500 1.3484 229 169.8309 
10 0.5000 0.5000 1.4142 238 168.2914 
11 0.5500 0.4500 1.4907 276 185.1464 
12 0.6000 0.4000 1.5811 247 156.2165 
13 0.6500 0.3500 1.6903 263 155.5929 
14 0.7000 0.3000 1.8257 270 147.8851 
15 0.7500 0.2500 2.0000 295 147.5000 
16 0.8000 0.2000 2.2361 356 159.2080 
17 0.8500 0.1500 2.5820 442 171.1859 
18 0.9000 0.1000 3.1623 567 179.3011 
19 0.9500 0.0500 4.4721 748 167.2579 
20 1.0000 0.0340 5.4233 1008 185.8660 
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For an α of 0.5 is a square rood factor for twenty time interval, which is 45 seconds 
each. Table 13 shows the RAB bid arrivals NHPP model testing result. For an α of 0.5 is 
a square rood factor for twenty time interval, which is 45 seconds each. 
Table 13 
NHPP Model Regression Result 
α Mean SD CV C (NHPP model)   
0.50 165.2101 16.0718 9.73% 30.6000  
 
In this model test process, T is 20, which is the total number of time intervals of 
the 15-minute section. Each time interval ID (s) was substituted into the standard 
function to get the intensity    estimates. From Table 12, the   
 
 
  of time interval 20 
would be 0 with 
 
 
 =1, so that the corresponding    would become an imaginary number. 
In case of that situation, the parameter of    
 
 
 for the    of time interval 20 was set as 
0.0034, which approaches 0.  
The number of bid arrivals of the NHPP model could be estimated by dividing 
the experimental number of bid arrivals by the corresponding intensity (Table 12). The 
mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variation were also gotten using Excel. The 
mean of estimated number of bid arrivals is 165. The standard deviation is 16.1. The 
estimated constant C is 30.6. In addition, the coefficient of variation is 9.7%, which is a 
relatively small coefficient of variation. The smaller this coefficient of variation, the 
more stable the actual experimental number of bid arrivals regression to the NHPP 
model. 
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The Excel model provided the tool to minimizing χ².   was varied from 0 to 1, 
for periods of 30, 45 and 60 seconds. The minimum χ² was found for an   of     
      as for 45 second interval. Any movement away for 45 seconds either up or down 
in time, increased χ² did change to  . The conclusion is that a NHPP model is best fitted 
at 45 second interval for an   of 0.5.  
Chi-square (Χ²) Test  
 Figure 14 shows a plot of the experiment data against to NHPP fit for 45-second 
at   of 0.5. 
 
Figure 14 Number of Bid Arrivals: Experiment vs NHPP Model  
 Figure 14 fits to the experiment data. Table 14 shows the Chi-square test process 
and result for   of 0.5 at 45-second intervals. 
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Table 14  
Chi-square Test 
Time interval 
ID (s) 
No. of bid 
arrivals 
(experiment) (n) 
s/T λ* No. of bid 
arrivals  
(E*) 
Residuals 
(n-E*) 
 χ²* 
1 153 0.0250 1.0127 166.6109 -13.6109 1.1119 
2 204 0.1000 1.0541 173.4141 30.5859 5.3946 
3 197 0.1500 1.0847 178.4416 18.5584 1.9301 
4 194 0.2000 1.1180 183.9334 10.0666 0.5509 
5 204 0.2500 1.1547 189.9656 14.0344 1.0368 
6 189 0.3000 1.1952 196.6331 -7.6331 0.2963 
7 179 0.3500 1.2403 204.0558 -25.0558 3.0766 
8 173 0.4000 1.2910 212.3880 -39.3880 7.3046 
9 229 0.4500 1.3484 221.8321 7.1679 0.2316 
10 238 0.5000 1.4142 232.6594 5.3406 0.1226 
11 276 0.5500 1.4907 245.2446 30.7554 3.8570 
12 247 0.6000 1.5811 260.1211 -13.1211 0.6619 
13 263 0.6500 1.6903 278.0812 -15.0812 0.8179 
14 270 0.7000 1.8257 300.3620 -30.3620 3.0691 
15 295 0.7500 2.0000 329.0301 -34.0301 3.5196 
16 356 0.8000 2.2361 367.8669 -11.8669 0.3828 
17 442 0.8500 2.5820 424.7761 17.2239 0.6984 
18 567 0.9000 3.1623 520.2423 46.7577 4.2024 
19 748 0.9500 4.4721 735.7337 12.2663 0.2045 
20 1008 0.9735 6.1430 1010.6080 -2.6080 0.0067 
 
Table 15 shows the Chi-square test process for   of 0.5 at 45-second intervals. 
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Table 15 
Chi-square Test Result 
α Total No. of bid 
arrivals (experiment) 
Total λ Total No. of bid 
arrivals (expected 
value) 
 χ² 
0.5 6432 39.0967 6432.0000 38.4764 
 
 The χ² statistic for the best fit was 38.5 and to         value for 19 degree of freedom is 
38.7. The NHPP provides a tolerable fit to the data. It is recommended that this data be refitted 
when more bid data becomes variable. The next step is the analysis is to determine the residual 
data. 
Human Element to the Bid Data 
From Figure 15 Residuals, the author found that the experimental value did not fit 
NHPP model perfectly, the author then plotted the Residuals and χ²* to analyze the 
contractors’ performance during RAB process. The residuals curve waved over time. 
The author tried to analyze and hypothesize the bidding dynamics behind this curve. 
Figure 15 shows the Residuals plot in 15-minute section. 
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Figure 15 Residuals 
Figure 15 shows the absolute value of residual data, which is the difference 
between the fitted model and the experiment data. Figure 15 shows the χ²* plot. Figure 
16 shows the χ²* result data plot for the fitted model. The residual data should be 
randomly scattered for a model with the optional fit. As is often observed in human data, 
there is cyclic pattern to the residual data. 
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Figure 16 χ² Test Results 
A Fast Fourier transform analysis of residual data expanded to include necessary 
zeros, as required for the analysis yields a cyclic pattern to the residual results. From a 
simple thought experiment, the following factors most likely play into creating the cyclic 
pattern. These factors are: 
 a start time is a bit variable to human, so game play does not commence at exact 
zero second. If this is true, the data should show a negative residual for the first 
period and higher residual for next few periods to corporation for the lost time. 
This is observed. 
 the end bidding rate is limited by the response time in types of human when 
presents with this data. In order to confirm this assumption, a small reaction time 
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counting experiment was set up. In this one-minute experiment, there were two 
students involved, A and B. Once student A typed a three-digit number on her 
screen A on her screen, student B typed the three-digit number B on his screen, 
which valued number A plus1. For the second round, the two students switched 
their screens. After several rounds of tests, the average time for reaction and 
typing was counted as 30 numbers per minute. Therefore, on the condition of 
limited reaction and typing time of human as well as the limited data exchange 
volume of the RAB system, it is reasonable that the bid arrivals did not keep 
rising as the model showed. 
 boredom in the middle, there is a peak in the FFT at about 5 minutes, we opine 
that human becomes bored with the game and slow the bidding rate, a important 
observation is that bidding in the middle reduces for available profit, which is not 
in the best interval of the λ player. The players as group, λ player, will try the 
maximizing their profit and by default return the best overall profit to the group. 
The second is a consequence of the first. Slowing the rate of bidding in the 
middle achieves this objective although usually affects the data bid of jobs. 
This simple thought experiment does not prove that the cyclic pattern is caused by 
these three problems. Future research is recommended on this issue. A simple review of 
the intervals of successful bids at industrial site will provide this information. 
Summary 
In this part, the author used model regression to test if RAB bid arrivals data fits 
NHPP model. The further model regression significance test was done via goodness-of 
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fit test. As the significant evidence, the testing results shows that RAB bid arrivals data 
can fit NHPP model. In addition, the changing of model residuals was explained by 
considering human behavior at games. 
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This is the twentieth Reverse Auction Bidding research in Texas A&M 
University. The research series were initiated by Mr. Robert G. Van Vleet II in 2004, 
who was introduced the tacit collision in bidding and bid shopping. Since that first study, 
nineteen studies have gathered data, or completed analysis of earlier studies. Guhya 
(2010) developed a significant number of the analysis techniques used for subsequent 
studies. Chouhan (2009) developed the study of personality related to returns in the 
game. 
Sufficient case study data exist now to complete longitudinal studies of the bid 
data. This is the first of these studies; the objective of the study is to examine the 
statistical properties of the bid arrival time data. Shmueli et. al, (2004) postulated a non-
homogeneous Poisson process model as the standard process for eBay online auction 
data. 
A review of the bid arrival data against four statistical models, Gaussian, Power-
law, homogeneous Poisson process and NHPP showed that the NHPP provided the best 
statistical fit to the bid arrival data. This result matches the findings from the eBay data. 
Although the common assumption is that a Reverse Auction Bidding is different to a 
normal auction in terms of price movement, the alternative objective remains of setting 
prices for goods and services. As with almost all economic transactions, that involves at 
least two players, a buyer and a seller. A simple two part games explain the RAB system. 
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Nine TAMU studies were established for development as an aggregate data set. 
A total of 6674 entries were reviewed to fit the model of the game play, about 242 were 
discarded. The data was binned in a different of time steps. A five- second interval plot 
showed evidence of the underlying Passion process. 
The NHPP model was developed that matched the number of bids in the 
experiment data, as the first fit point. A statistical study, varying the time interval width 
from 30 to 60 second each, showed that a 45-second time interval of the data, with a 
model parameter   of           yielded the lowest χ² aggregate for the data. 
Fast Fourier transformation analysis of the residual data showed that a few cyclic 
patterns were evident in the residual data. A number of minor human behaviors affects in a 
minor manner the results set. These concerns are a slowness to start bidding, a slight over 
compensation, just a start to catch up, boredom in the middle of the bidding period at 15-minute 
section and “bid sniping” at the end. The Fast Fourier transformation analysis indicated these 
minor cyclic patterns. 
Reverse Auction Bidding studies provide a powerful tool to understand human 
behaviors in bidding, to see the underlying statistics is some detail and to gather a lot of 
fundamental data. The same statement is not true for other bidding system where limited 
data is available. This study confirms the hypothesis that a statistical distribution is 
existing to model the bid arrival times for a RAB game. The model with the best fit is a 
NHPP model as postulated for eBay online auction bid arrivals. 
Future research concerns are: 
 bid arrival time related to personality type; 
 bid arrival time related to number of bidder; 
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 bid cost step by bidders; 
 rate of return. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE KEIRSEY TEMPERAMENT SORTER 
For each question, decide on answer a or b and put a check mark in the proper 
column of the answer sheet.  Scoring directions are provided.  There is no right or wrong 
answers since about half the population agrees with whatever answer you choose.   
 
1. When the phone rings do you 
a. hurry to get to it first 
b. hope someone will answer 
2. Are you more 
a. observant than introspective 
b. introspective than observant 
3. Is it worse to  
a. have your head in the clouds 
b. be in a rut 
4. With people are you usually more 
a. firm than gentle 
b. gentle than firm 
5. Are you more comfortable in 
making 
a. critical judgments 
b. value judgments 
6. Is clutter in the workplace 
something you 
a. take time to straighten up 
b. tolerate pretty well 
7. Is it your way to  
a. make up your mind quickly 
b. pick and choose at some length 
8. Waiting in line, do you often 
a. chat with others 
b. b.  stick to business 
9. Are you more 
a. sensible than ideational 
b. ideational than sensible 
10. Are you more interested in  
a. what is actual 
b. what is possible 
11. In making up your mind are you 
more likely  
a. to go by data 
b. to go by desires   
12. In sizing up others do you tend to 
be 
a. objective and impersonal 
b. friendly and personal 
13. Do you prefer contracts to be 
a. signed, sealed, and delivered 
b. settled on a handshake 
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14. Are you more satisfied having 
a. a finished product 
b. work in progress 
15.   At a party, do you 
a. interact with many, even 
strangers 
b. interact with a few friends 
16.   Do you tend to be more 
a. factual than speculative 
b. speculative than factual 
17. Do you like writers who 
a. say what they mean 
b. use metaphors and symbolism 
18. Which appeals to you more: 
a. consistency of thought 
b. harmonious relationships 
19. If you must disappoint someone are 
you  
a. usually frank and 
straightforward 
b. warm and considerate 
20. On the job do you want your 
activities 
a. scheduled 
b. unscheduled 
21. Do you more often prefer 
a. final, unalterable statements 
b. tentative, preliminary statements 
22. Does interacting with strangers 
a. energize you 
b. tax your reserves 
23. Facts 
a. speak for themselves 
b. illustrate principles 
24. Do you find visionaries and 
theorists 
a. somewhat annoying 
b. rather fascinating 
25. In a heated discussion, do you 
a. stick to your guns 
b. look for common ground 
26. Is it better to be 
a. Just 
b. merciful 
27. At work, is it more natural for you 
to 
a. point out mistakes 
b. try to please others 
28. Are you more comfortable 
a. after a decision 
b. before a decision 
29. Do you tend to 
a. say right out what’s on your 
mind 
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b. keep your ears open 
30. Common sense is 
a. usually reliable 
b. frequently questionable 
31. Children often do not 
a. make themselves useful enough 
b. exercise their fantasy enough 
32. When in charge of others do you 
tend to be 
a. firm and unbending 
b. forgiving and lenient 
33. Are you more often 
a. a cool-headed person 
b. a warm-hearted person 
34. Are you prone to 
a. nailing things down 
b. exploring the possibilities 
35. In most situations are you more 
a. deliberate than spontaneous 
b. spontaneous than deliberate 
36. Do you think of yourself as 
a. an outgoing person 
b. a private person 
37. Are you more frequently 
a. a practical sort of person 
b. a fanciful sort of person 
38. Do you speak more in  
a. particulars than generalities 
b. generalities than particular 
39. Which is more of a compliment: 
a. “There’s a logical person” 
b. “There’s a sentimental person”  
40. Which rules you more 
a. your thoughts 
b. your feelings 
41. When finishing a job, do you like to 
a. tie up all the loose ends 
b. move on to something else 
42. Do you prefer to work 
a. to deadlines 
b. just whenever 
43. Are you the kind of person who 
a. is rather talkative 
b. doesn’t miss much 
44. Are you inclined to take what is 
said 
a. more literally 
b. more figuratively 
45. Do you more often see 
a. what’s right in front of you 
b. what can only be imagined 
46. Is it worse to be 
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a. softy 
b. hard-nosed 
47. In trying circumstances are you 
sometimes 
a. too unsympathetic 
b. too sympathetic 
48. Do you tend to choose 
a. rather carefully 
b. somewhat impulsively 
49. Are you inclined to be more 
a. hurried than leisurely 
b. leisurely than hurried 
50. At work do you tend to 
a. be sociable with your colleagues 
b. keep more to yourself 
51. Are you more likely to trust 
a. your experiences 
b. your conceptions 
52. Are you more inclined to feel 
a. down to earth 
b. somewhat removed 
53. Do you think of yourself as a  
a. tough-minded person 
b. tender-hearted person 
54. Do you value in yourself more that 
you are 
a. reasonable 
b. devoted 
55. Do you usually want things 
a. settled and decided 
b. just penciled in 
56. Would you say you are more 
a. serious and determined 
b. easy going 
57. Do you consider yourself 
a. a good conversationalist 
b. a good listener 
58. Do you prize in yourself 
a. a strong hold on reality 
b. a vivid imagination 
59. Are you drawn more to 
a. fundamentals 
b. overtones 
60. Which seems the greater fault 
a. to be too compassionate 
b. to be too dispassionate 
61. Are you swayed more by 
a. convincing evidence 
b. a touching appeal 
62. Do you feel better about 
a. coming to closure 
b. keeping your options open 
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63. Is it preferable mostly to  
a. make sure things are arranged 
b. just let things happen naturally 
64. Are you inclined to be 
a. easy to approach 
b. somewhat reserved 
65. In stories do you prefer 
a. action and adventure 
b. fantasy and heroism 
66. Is it easier for you to 
a. put others to good use 
b. identify with others 
67. Which do you wish more for 
yourself: 
a. strength of will 
b. strength of emotion 
68. Do you see yourself as basically 
a. thick-skinned 
b. thin-skinned 
69. Do you tend to notice 
a. disorderliness 
b. opportunities for change 
70. Are you more 
a. routinized than whimsical 
b.  whimsical than routinized  
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Figure 17 Sample Score Card 
 
 
 
